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ABSTRACT
The Article analyzes the International Court of Justice’s decision in
the Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v.
Chile) case and its failure to provide an original and effective legal
solution to an important territorial dispute in Latin America. As a
response to this, this Article makes the case for the engagement of other
institutions and actors including the Secretary General of the United
Nations, the Organization of American States, and Pope Francis, who
could facilitate mediation processes for the resolution of this
international conflict. This Article considers historical facts that
demonstrate the intention of the parties to find a negotiated solution to
their territorial dispute. It makes the case for using mediation and
conciliation, for the resolution of the conflict, and makes arguments
against power politics and the use of military force as instruments for
the resolution of the territorial dispute. Moreover, this Article
demonstrates that the people of Bolivia and Chile can find a mutually
beneficial solution to their dispute by creating, among others, civil
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society reconciliation commissions with the leading participation of
indigenous people. Finally, this Article makes the case for indigenous
peoples, as the original owners of the territory under dispute, to become
essential actors in the process of resolving the conflict.
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INTRODUCTION
In the case Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean, the
International Court of Justice (“I.C.J.”), contrary to Bolivia’s petition,
ruled that Chile did not have a legal obligation to negotiate sovereign
access to the Pacific Ocean with Bolivia. 1 Despite its ruling, the I.C.J.
encouraged Bolivia and Chile to continue their historical efforts in
1. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile),
Judgment, 2018 I.C.J. 507, ¶ 564 (Oct. 1). https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/caserelated/153/153-20181001-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf.
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drafting a solution to the international territorial dispute. In particular,
the I.C.J. stated:
[T]he Court’s finding should not be understood as precluding the
Parties from continuing their dialogue and exchanges, in a spirit of
good neighborliness, to address the issues relating to the landlocked
situation of Bolivia, the solution to which they have both recognized
to be a matter of mutual interest. With willingness on the part of the
Parties, meaningful negotiations can be undertaken. 2

The I.C.J.’s ruling was consistent with Article 33.1 of the United
Nations (“U.N.”) Charter because there are other legal means, besides
judicial settlement, for the peaceful resolution of the Bolivia-Chile
territorial dispute, including mediation and conciliation. 3 However, it is
important to remember that I.C.J. decisions are valid only for a specific
case, and they are not considered precedents for other cases in the same
court, or other international or national tribunals. 4 Therefore, Bolivia
could continue to attempt the adjudicatory venue to achieve its
objective of finding a negotiated solution to obtain a sovereign access
to the Pacific Ocean. However, a better approach would be for both
sides, Bolivia and Chile, to use other means for the peaceful resolution
of their territorial dispute.
As a person of Bolivian descent and a professor of international
law, my analysis seeks to understand the implications of the I.C.J.
decision for Bolivia and propose a peaceful means for the resolution of
the Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute that considers the interests of
indigenous people. This Article analyzes the reasoning of the I.C.J.
judges and their failure to provide an original and effective legal
discourse to enable Bolivia and Chile to continue their efforts to find a
negotiated solution to their territorial dispute. This Article highlights
the dissenting opinions of the president of the I.C.J., Abdulqawi
Ahmed Yusuf, Judge Patrick Lipton Robinson, Judge Nawaf Salam,
and ad hoc Judge Yves Daudet. This Article also proposes the
engagement of other institutions and actors including the Secretary
2. Id.
3. U.N. Charter art. 105 ¶ 3.
4. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
According to Article 59 of the Statute: “The decision of the Court has no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” Id.
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General of the U.N., António Guterres, the Organization of American
States (“O.A.S.”), and Pope Francis, who could facilitate mediation and
conciliation processes for the resolution of the dispute.
This Article makes the case for indigenous people, as the original
owners of the territory in dispute, to become essential actors in public
diplomacy efforts to facilitate negotiation processes between Chile and
Bolivia. The Article demonstrates that the people of Chile and Bolivia
can find a mutually beneficial solution to their dispute by creating,
among others, civil society reconciliation commissions. It shows that
this can contribute to building up a political context favorable to the
resolution of their territorial disputes and to the development of better
international relations between Bolivia and Chile.
I. POWER POLITICS AND NATIONAL INTERESTS
To understand the Bolivia-Chile conflict, it is important to know
the historical context that has influenced their international relations. It
is also important to understand the ideas, in Chile and Bolivia, that have
created the conditions for intense conflicts and the lack of political will
to resolve their territorial disputes. Colonialism, racism, and militarism
are some of the ideologies that have influenced the international
relations between the two countries. 5
Chile and Bolivia’s histories have each been characterized by
totalitarian regimes that have sustained racist views of indigenous
populations in both countries. 6 In Chile, the dictatorship of General
Augusto Pinochet protected Neo-Nazi movements that embraced racist
and violent views of politics. 7 Military dictatorships in Bolivia,
including the one of General Garcia Meza, protected Nazi war criminals

5. See Aparajita Gangopadhyay, From Land Wars to Gas Wars: Chile—Bolivia
Relations and Globalisation, 70 India Quarterly 139, 139 (2014).
6. See Javiera Barandiarán, Researching Race in Chile, 47 LATIN AM. RES. REV.
161, 169 (2012) (analyzing racial discrimination in Chile); see also Henry Stobart,
Bolivia’s Anti-Racism Law: Transforming a Culture?, in CULTURES OF ANTI-RACISM
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 191–92 (Peter Wade et al., eds., 2019)
(analyzing racism in Bolivia and legal reforms to address it).
7. See generally Ricardo Lagos et al., The Pinochet Dilemma, 114 FOREIGN
POL’Y 26–39 (1999) (analyzing charges for crimes against humanity against Chilean
President Pinochet); see also HUGH O’SHAUGHNESSY, PINOCHET: THE POLITICS OF
TORTURE 49–118 (2000).
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such as Klaus Barbie. 8 Both countries have embraced views based on
racist presuppositions, and both have been guilty of widespread
violations of human rights, including tortures and killings of political
opponents. 9 One of the main features of these totalitarian movements
was their views regarding the racial inferiority of indigenous
communities. For example, in Chile there is widespread recognition of
its mestizo identity, which is the result of the integration of the Spanish
and indigenous races. 10 Despite this fact, there is also a lack of
acknowledgment of the importance of indigenous peoples in Chile’s
political and economic structures. Indeed, “today’s actual living and
breathing indigenous peoples are both actively ignored and ‘excluded
symbolically and materially’ from Chilean society . . . . As a result,
Chile purportedly has no ‘Indian problem,’ unlike its more ‘indigenous’
and ‘backwards’ geopolitical rivals and neighbors, Bolivia and Peru.”11
The influence of totalitarian ideologies, in both countries, provided
a foundation for racist and discriminatory treatment of indigenous
communities. 12 In that historical context, it was very difficult to
construct effective efforts to resolve Bolivia’s landlocked situation.13
The ruling elites of both countries have focused on the protection of

8. See generally PETER MCFARREN & FADRIQUE IGLESIAS, THE DEVIL’S
AGENT: LIFE, TIME AND CRIMES OF NAZI KLAUS BARBIE (2013).
9. Id. at 49–118.
10. Kevin Funk, “Today There Are No Indigenous People” in Chile?
Connecting the Mapuche Struggle to Anti-Neoliberal Mobilizations in South America,
4 J. POL. LATIN AM. 125, 127 (2013).
11. Id. at 127–28 n. 3 (“the quotation in this essay’s title – that ‘today there are
no indigenous people’ in Chile – is from a 1978 report by the Chilean government’s
Agricultural and Livestock Development Agency . . . summarizing the Pinochet
regime’s posture towards indigenous claims.”).
12. See generally Graeme S. Mount, Chile and the Nazis, in MEMORY,
OBLIVION, AND JEWISH CULTURE IN LATIN AMERICA 77–90 (Agosin Marjorie ed.,
2005) (discussing the influence of Nazis in Chile); see also Jean Grugel, Nationalist
Movements and Fascist Ideology in Chile, 4 BULL. LATIN AM. RES. 109–22 (1985);
see also MCFARREN & FADRIQUE IGLESIAS, supra note 8 (analyzing the influence of
Nazis in Bolivia).
13. Jean Grugel, Nationalist Movements and Fascist Ideology in Chile, 4 BULL.
LATIN AM. RES. 109, 113 (1985).
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their economic and political interests and have disregarded the interests
of important sectors of society, namely indigenous people. 14
The belief that Chilean society is superior because of its European
identity and Bolivia is an inferior country because of its large
indigenous population is completely contrary to sociological, historical,
and scientific evidence. 15 Consistent with this reality, there are sectors
of Chilean society that have supported efforts for the peaceful
resolution of territorial disputes between Chile and Bolivia. 16 Applying
a constructivist perspective of international relations, it can be said that
prevalent ethnocentric ideas in Chile and Bolivia have shaped both
countries’ international relations.
In the current historical context, Bolivia and Chile are facing
political instability. President Evo Morales, who was one of the main
proponents to take the Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute to the I.C.J., was
removed from power. 17 As a result, there is an ongoing process to have
new presidential elections in Bolivia. 18 Ethnic and political conflicts
have become more prevalent in Bolivia. In Chile, around twenty-six
protesters were killed during demonstrations against President
Sebastián Piñera’s government. 19 Following the demonstrations in
Chile, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights
said, “during the recent mass protests and state of emergency the police
and army failed to adhere to international human rights norms and
14. See Leslie E. Wehner, Developing Mutual Trust: The Othering Process
between Bolivia and Chile, 36 CAN. J. LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN STUD. 109, 125–26
(2011) (analyzing the ruling elites of Bolivia and Chiles and their roles in increasing
conflict between the two countries).
15. See ALANA LENTIN, RACISM AND ANTI-RACISM IN EUROPE 72, 77 (2004)
(analyzing false presuppositions of racist ideologies).
16. See, e.g., Canciller Ribera calificó de “lamentable” apoyo de diputados
opositores a demanda marítima de Bolivia, EL MOSTRADOR (July 30, 2019),
https://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2019/07/30/canciller-ribera-califico-delamentable-apoyo-de-diputados-opositores-a-demanda-maritima-de-bolivia/
(For
example, Chilean congressman, Boris Barrera, and Chilean Senator, Alejandro
Navarro, supported Bolivia’s case to obtain a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean).
17. See Kevin Clarke, Was there a coup in Bolivia? After Evo Morales, what’s
next?, AM. MAG. (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.americamagazine.org/politicssociety/2019/11/27/was-there-coup-bolivia-after-evo-morales-whats-next.
18. Id.
19. Chile protests: UN accuses security forces of human rights abuses, BBC
NEWS (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-50779466.
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standards relating to management of assemblies and the use of force.”20
Because of generalized discontent regarding economic and social
injustice, and despite the Chilean success at the I.C.J. in the BoliviaChile case, President Sebastián Piñera is one of the least popular
presidents in the history of Chile with a fourteen percent approval
rating. 21 These facts demonstrate the political and social fragility of
Latin American societies that have not addressed their ethnic and social
justice issues properly.
Despite the similarities between Bolivia and Chile, there are also
meaningful differences, including their military power.
According to the World Bank, Bolivia’s military expenditure in
2018 was 1.5% of its GDP. 22 In 2017, Bolivia had 71,000 armed forces
personnel, which is 1.3% of its labor force. 23 Chile’s military
expenditure in 2018 was 1.9% of its GDP, and in 2017, Chile had
122,000 armed forces personnel, which is 1.3% of its labor force. 24
Because of Chile’s historic military and economic superiority, there has
been unequal bargaining relations between Chile and Bolivia. 25 This
type of relationship illustrates how “[p]ower can be thought of as the
ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would
not do . . . .” 26 It is important to also note that besides military power,
there are other forms of power, including economic, cultural, and
moral. 27
20. U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, UN Human Rights
Office report on Chile crisis describes multiple police violations and calls for reforms,
OHCHR
(Dec.
13,
2019),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25423&
LangID=E.
21. Dave Sherwood, Support for Chile’s Pinera lowest for president since
Pinochet era: poll, REUTERS (Oct. 27, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/uschile-protests/support-for-chiles-pinera-lowest-for-president-since-pinochet-erapoll-idUSKBN1X60NW.
22. The World Bank, World Development Indicators: Military expenditures and
arms transfers. http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/5.7 (last visited Nov. 9, 2020).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Gangopadhyay, supra note 5, at 141.
26. ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE:
WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION 11 (1997).
27. See Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power, 80 FOREIGN POL’Y 153, 155 (1990)
(analyzing soft power as a concept).
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Considering this reality, Bolivia and Chile should make efforts to
change the characteristics of their bilateral relations, which are
characterized by mutual distrust, and acknowledge that it is consistent
with their national interests to improve their international trade
relations, their mutual commitment to the protection of the
environment, and their commitment for the protection of fundamental
human rights among others. 28 These countries should also take steps to
restore their diplomatic relations to jointly address global problems of
mutual interest. A peaceful resolution of territorial disputes is necessary
to transform the broken international relations between Bolivia and
Chile. Cooperation is even more crucial due to the extreme human and
economic costs of the COVID-19 pandemic—especially in Latin
America. In the current context, sustained international cooperation
between neighboring countries such as Bolivia and Chile is essential.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY, OR POWER POLITICS?
Because of its historically superior military and economic strength,
Chile’s foreign policy has denied Bolivia’s aspirations to obtain a
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. Chile nonetheless has negotiated
frequently, under the auspices of international organizations, with
Bolivia to resolve their territorial dispute, including at the IberoAmerican Summit (2003) and the Monterrey Summit of the Americas
(2004). 29 Beginning in 2012, at the Sixty-Seventh session of the U.N.
General Assembly—and contrary to the historical trend—Chile started

28. See Wehner, supra note 14, at 109–38 (analyzing the mutual distrust in the
bilateral relations between Chile and Bolivia, and some efforts to change that
dynamic).
29. See Christopher R. Rossi, A Case Ill Suited for Judgment: Constructing ‘A
Sovereign Access to the Sea’ in the Atacama Desert, 48 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
28, 79 (2017) (“The parties returned to numerous bilateral meetings in Uruguay (the
‘Fresh Approach’ meetings, 1986-87), at the XIII Ibero-American Summit in Bolivia
(2003), at the Monterrey Summit of the Americas (2004), on four occasions in 2005,
(New York, Salamanca, Mar del Plata, and Montevideo). During the Sixty-Seventh
Session of the United Nations General Assembly in 2012, Bolivia affirmed that
bilateral options remained open with Chile; Chile responded by declaring Bolivia
lacks any legal basis for claiming a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean by territories
belonging to Chile”).
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to express a lack of willingness to continue diplomatic negotiations to
resolve Bolivia’s landlocked situation. 30
In reaction to an unfavorable array of opposing international
political forces, which prevented the continuation of bilateral
diplomatic negotiations, Bolivia pursued an international adjudicatory
mechanism to persuade Chile to continue their negotiations. In 2013,
Bolivia brought a petition to the I.C.J. against Chile. 31 However, the
court ruled against Bolivia and decided Chile does not have a legal
obligation to negotiate Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific
Ocean. 32 Although it was not the intention of the I.C.J., the court’s
decision has validated the views of certain sectors of Chilean and
Bolivian societies who believe military power is the only means to
resolve territorial disputes between sovereign states.
By ruling in favor of Chile—the country with more military
might—and by deciding that Chile does not have a legal obligation to
negotiate with Bolivia—the weaker militant country—the I.C.J. failed
to contribute to finding a normative solution to the countries’ longlasting territorial dispute. This conflict will continue to influence
international relations between Chile and Bolivia significantly, and will
also continue to have a negative impact in regional political and
economic integration in South America. 33
Despite denying the existence of Chile’s legal obligation to
negotiate with Bolivia, the I.C.J. has recognized the historical necessity,
for both countries, of continuing their diplomatic effort to find a
solution to Bolivia’s landlocked situation. 34 At this juncture, one of the
main questions is whether powerful political elements will form
bilateral relations between Chile and Bolivia, or if a normative solution
to resolve territorial disputes by peaceful means, consistent with
30. Id. at 79–80.
31. See generally Erica Endlein, Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific
Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile): Deal Or No Deal, 27 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 365 (2019);
see also International Court of Justice, Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific
Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), ICJ-CIJ, https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/153-By (specifying
Bolivia brought the petition).
32. Endlein, supra note 31, at 371.
33. See generally Mitchell A. Seligson, Popular Support for Regional Economic
Integration in Latin America, 31 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 129–50 (1999) (analyzing the
support of Latin Americans to processes of economic integration).
34. Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶ 564.
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principles of global justice, will prevail. If the power political paradigm
continues, Chile will continue to impose its views on Bolivia through
superior military power. If the normative-global justice perspective
prevails, then both countries will use mediation, conciliation, and other
normative mechanism to find a peaceful solution to their territorial
dispute.
Considering the overwhelming majority of Bolivians have a
lifelong ideological and cultural commitment to restore their country’s
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and that sectors of the Chilean
population also believe in the importance of finding a mutually
beneficial resolution of the conflict, there is a historical and moral
imperative to find a normative solution. Against the failure of the I.C.J.
to apply international law norms in an effective manner to contribute to
restore the negotiated solution venue for the Bolivia-Chile territorial
dispute, the discourse of international law continues to lay the
foundation to resolve the conflict. 35 International law recognizes the
importance of the principle of equality of sovereign states to maintain
peaceful relations between and among sovereign states. 36 Developing
nations, such as Bolivia, which struggle against powerful neighbor
countries, such as Chile, are interested in a just interpretation and
implementation of international legal standards to resolve issues that
undermine their economic development, such as the lack of access to
the oceans.
Chile’s reliance on its superior military power to ensure that Bolivia
accepts its landlocked condition has shaped relations between the
countries. In place of militant might, Bolivia has relied on diplomacy,
international institutions, and international law to resolve its territorial
disputes with Chile. 37 Chileans and Bolivians need to understand the
importance of resolving their territorial disputes as part of

35. See generally Oisin Suttle, Law as Deliberative Discourse: The Politics of
International Legal Argument - Social Theory with Historical Illustrations,
12 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 154–64 (2016) (analyzing International Law as a
discourse).
36. See, e.g., STEVE RATNER, THE THIN JUSTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A
MORAL RECKONING OF THE LAW OF NATIONS (2015) (discussing the sovereign
equality of nation norms as legal and moral principles).
37. See Rossi, supra note 29, at 80.
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implementing objectives consistent with the national interests of both
countries. 38
Consistent with a constructivist perspective, 39 Chile and Bolivia
must accept that their prejudices of each other have influenced their
international bilateral relations and their territorial disputes to the
disadvantage of both. 40 Recognition of the value of the differences
between the neighboring countries will enrich and help manifest their
common destiny. A recognition of the historical importance of
indigenous peoples’ contributions to the wellbeing of both countries
can provide a new foundation for understanding of their national
interests. A fresh approach is needed for Chile and Bolivia to resolve
their conflicts and promote economic integration processes for the
benefit of both countries.
III. THE TERRITORY OF BOLIVIA AND CHILE, THE INCA EMPIRE, AND
THE UTI POSSIDETIS PRINCIPLE
It is essential to understand the place of indigenous people, such as
the Aymara, Mapuche, and Quechua in Bolivia and Chile, to fully
comprehend the concept of sovereignty in the context of the BoliviaChile conflict. An indigenous perspective regarding the Bolivia-Chile
conflict must consider the historical characteristics of the territory
under dispute.
The Inca Empire was sovereign over the territories that now
constitute the Atacama Desert. 41 The survivors of the Inca Empire are
now the Aymara, Quechua, Mapuche, and other indigenous people of
Bolivia and Chile. 42
38. See generally MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 1–33 (1996) (analyzing the concept of national interest).
39. See generally Sarina They, Introducing Constructivism in International
Relations Theory, E-INT’L REL., February 23, 2018, https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/72842.
40. See DAVID A. BALDWIN, POWER AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A
CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 139–54 (2016) (analyzing the constructivist perspectives in
international relations).
41. See John Hyslop & Mario Rivera, An Expedition on the Inca Road in the
Atacama Desert, 37 ARCHAEOLOGY 33, 33 (1984).
42. See Indigenous Latin America in the Twenty-First Century: The First
BANK
GROUP
25
(2015),
Decade,
WORLD
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/145891467991974540/pdf/98544REVISED-WP-P148348-Box394854B-PUBLIC-Indigenous-Latin-America.pdf (For
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Tiwanaku was one of the most advanced indigenous pre-Incan
civilizations, which shaped the cultures and territories of what is now
Bolivia and Chile, including Atacama, a coastal desert. 43 Before the
Spanish conquest of the New World, indigenous peoples were the
owners of territories like the one under dispute between Chile and
Bolivia. With regard to the ownership of the coast of Atacama by
indigenous people, Diremar (Strategic Management for Maritime
Vindication) states:
The bonds connecting the Andean region with the coast of Atacama
date back to ancient times when indigenous territories were
connected permanently to the ocean. During its expansionist phase,
the Tiwanaku culture built at least seven settlements in the Azapa
Valley, right along the Pacific coast. In the southwestern part of its
dominion, the Inca Empire stretched as far as the Atacama
Desert. . . . These bonds were respected under colonial rule, which
explains why Bolivia was founded in possession of a vast and
wealthy seacoast in the Atacama region. Bolivia exercised
sovereignty over this territory until 1879, when the Chilean invasion
changed the country’s geography and history. 44

Considering the descendants of indigenous peoples, original
owners of Atacama, are still an important part of the populations of
Bolivia and Chile, it is essential to understand their views and interests.
This is the case because Spanish conquerors took away their original
territories, including Atacama, and exploited their natural resources. 45
Indeed, “[t]o say that Bolivia, Chile, or Peru first owned the land, and
that it was taken from them, ignores the fact that land ownership is itself
an artificial construct. The natives were there before any modern

the number of indigenous populations in Bolivia and Chile) [hereinafter WORLD
BANK GROUP].
43. See Kelly J. Knudson, Tiwanaku Influence in the South-Central Andes:
Strontium Isotope Analysis and Middle Horizon Migration, 19 LATIN AM. ANTIQUITY
3, 6 (2008) (discussing the influence of Tiwanaku on the territory of Atacama).
44. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF BOLIVIA: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT FOR
MARITIME VINDICATION - DIREMAR, THE BOOK OF THE SEA 15 (2015) [hereinafter
DIREMAR].
45. See PAUL J. ZWIER, PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ARENA, TALKING WITH EVIL 223–24 (2013).
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nation-states with defined boundaries existed.” 46 The people that
owned the Atacama Desert were part of the Inca Empire. To
comprehend the importance of this fundamental historical fact, it is
necessary to know the historical background of the original owners of
the territory under current dispute between Bolivia and Chile. No
history of the region would be complete without recognizing the
influence of the Inca Empire as the leader of the Andean civilization. 47
The Incas had a high level of economic and political power, which
they used to conquer and colonize other indigenous nations. Although
there are different theories about the origins of the Incas, there is
consensus among scholars that the civilization of Tiwanaku preceded
and influenced the formation of the Inca Empire. 48 A diversity of
nations were part of the Andean civilization, both before and after the
establishment of the Inca Empire, including the Colla, Lupaca,
Omasuyu, and Pacaje. 49 The power of the Inca Empire was manifest in
its economic, cultural, political, normative, and military development.
50 The production and distribution of food, sophisticated constructions
of roads and the creation of beautiful art, and other cultural expressions
were examples of the positive aspects of Inca society. Among the
tangible elements of power, the territory and population of a nation are
important. 51 Regarding the Inca domain:
At the time of the Spanish Conquest in A.D.1532, the majority of the
vast territory of Andean South America had been united into a single
46. Id. at 223.
47. See, e.g., HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS, THE
STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (1951) (To determine the power and influence of
nations, it is important to consider military, political, economic, and other aspects. For
Morgenthau, a classic exponent of realism, the elements of national power are
geography, natural resources, military preparedness, industrial capacity, population,
national character, national morale and the quality of diplomacy).
48. See, e.g., JOHN WAYNE JANUSEK, IDENTITY AND POWER IN THE ANCIENT
ANDES 225 (2004).
49. See, e.g., WALDEMAR ESPINOZA SORIANO, LOS INCAS, ECONOMÍA,
SOCIEDAD Y ESTADO EN LA ERA DEL TAHUANTINSUYO (3d ed. 1997).
50. See GEOFFREY W. CONRAD & ARTHUR A. DEMAREST, RELIGION AND
EMPIRE: THE DYNAMICS OF AZTEC AND INCA EXPANSIONISM 36 (2005).
51. See, e.g., Michael Barnett & Duvall Raymond, Power in International
Politics, 59 INT’L ORG. 39, 39 (2005) (analyzing the concept of power and its
elements).
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political entity now commonly called the Inca Empire. Known to its
rulers as Tawantinsuyu, meaning roughly ‘The Land of Four
Quarters’ in the Inca language, this empire included parts of the
modern countries of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina,
and Chile. 52

Considering these historical facts, there was once a unity between
the people of Bolivia Chile. 53 Furthermore, despite the Spanish
conquest and colonization of the New World, and the systematic efforts
to destroy indigenous peoples and their cultures, the descendants of the
Inca Empire have survived in both countries. 54
The Incas believed in the existence of many gods, such as Inti,
Pachamama, and others. 55 Specifically, the principles of reciprocity
and duality were the foundations of the Inca worldview:
The world was viewed as being balanced between a series of dual
opposing forces. Contrasting forces encompassing such concepts as
upper versus lower, light versus dark, wet versus dry, heat versus
cold, male versus female, and so on, complemented each other,
providing an equilibrium in which life could exist. . .The purpose of
Andean religion was to delineate the basic divisions of the cosmos
and maintain them in harmony through reciprocal exchange. . . 56

The Incas had fundamental normative principles such as ama llulla,
ama sua, ama qhella (“do not be a thief,” “do not be a liar,” “do not be
lazy”). 57 The Incan Empire used religious narratives to accomplish
normative and political objectives. The influence of the Inca, and other
indigenous peoples’ worldviews, is still seen in social and political

52. GORDON F. MCEWAN, THE INCAS: NEW PERSPECTIVES 3 (2006).
53. Id.
54. See WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 42 (For the numbers and importance
of indigenous people in Latin America).
55. See generally MARÍA ROSTWOROWSKI, OBRAS COMPLETAS VII,
ESTRUCTURAS ANDINAS DEL PODER, IDEOLOGÍA RELIGIOSA Y POLÍTICA (2007)
(analyzing the Andean religious worldviews and its influence in political structures).
56. See MCEWAN, supra note 52, at 137–38.
57. See, e.g., FEDERICO GENG DELGADO, HISTORIA DEL DERECHO DEL
DERECHO PERUANO 30 (2005).
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movements in Latin America including Bolivia and Chile. 58 Concepts
such as reciprocity, equilibrium, and the importance of mother earth,
are part of the ancestral creed that has run with the land. The common
identity and experiences of indigenous peoples, such as the Aymara,
Mapuche, and Quechua, are seen in Bolivia and Chile. 59 Their historical
experience and their philosophical understandings can help find an
original solution to the territorial dispute between the two countries.
After the Spanish conquest of the Andean region of South America,
indigenous territories were occupied, and indigenous populations were
systematically assimilated and, in some cases, exterminated. 60 Because
of the Spanish conquest and colonization of the New World, indigenous
peoples lost their territories. The uti possidetis legal principle was
applied to determine the territorial boundaries of the countries of Latin
America and created the conditions for territorial conflicts among Latin
American countries. 61 The uti possidetis principle has been applied in
Latin America in the following way:
To guard against contested boundary claims, emerging Latin
American republics employed the principle of uti possidetis. The
principle froze territorial title at the moment of independence, ‘no
matter how arbitrary those boundaries may have been drawn.’ As a
convenient means of quieting title, the principle ensured that colonial
boundaries instantly became international boundaries for Latin
America’s new republics. It proved a costly means of securing nonviolent transitions to sovereignty, and it has been criticized for its
agnostic regard for the human populations disrupted by the territorial
divisions. 62

58. See generally Salvador Martí Puig, The Emergence of Indigenous
Movements in Latin America and Their Impact on the Latin American Political Scene:
Interpretive Tools at the Local and Global Levels, 37 LATIN AM. PERSP. 74 (2010)
(analyzing indigenous people in political processes).
59. See generally C. Xavier Albó, Aymaras Entre Bolivia, Perú y Chile,
19 ESTUDIOS ATACAMEÑOS 43 (2000) (analyzing the Aymara people of South
America).
60. See generally David Maybury-Lewis, Genocide Against Indigenous
Peoples, in ANNIHILATING DIFFERENCE: THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF GENOCIDE 45–53
(Alexander Laban Hinton ed., 2002) (analyzing genocide in the conquest and
colonization of nations).
61. See Rossi, supra note 29.
62. Id. at 54.
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The Bolivian Republic applied the uti possidetis principle in its
formation, after obtaining its independence from Spain in 1985.63 In
1826, Bolivia was subdivided into provinces, including Atacama,
which became part of the department of Potosi. 64 Considering this
reality, a potential solution to the Bolivia-Chile dispute could grant
indigenous peoples of Chile and Bolivia shared sovereignty over parts
of Atacama. 65 This will enable Bolivia to have sovereign access to the
Pacific Ocean, and will create a model of sustainable economic
integration by recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples including
their self-determination.
Bolivia is one of the most indigenous countries in Latin America.
According to the World Bank, there are 4.12 million indigenous
peoples, which is 41% of the Bolivian population. 66 According to the
Chilean Census, in Chile, 12.8% of the population identify as
indigenous. In that country, there are 2.185 million indigenous people.
This includes the Mapuche (79.8 %), Aymara (7.2 %), and Diaguita
(4.1 %). 67 Regarding the Mapachu indigenous population of Chile, “the
Mapuche were the most successful indigenous group in the Americas
at resisting Spanish colonialism, maintaining an independent existence
in their homelands until conquered by Chile’s violent ‘pacification’
campaign in 1883. More recently, the Mapuche have also been the most
active indigenous group in Chile . . . .” 68
The Spanish conquest and colonization of the New World were
characterized by the disregard of the sovereignty of indigenous political
communities. 69 This was consistent with the views of Spanish
government officials and some scholars that believed in the ethnic
“natural” inferiority of indigenous peoples and the right of Spain to take
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

DIREMAR, supra note 44, at 15.
Id.
See Rossi, supra note 29.
WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 42, at 25.
INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ESTADÍSTICA, 2DA ENTREGA RESULTADOS
DEFINITIVOS
CENSO
2017,
http://www.censo2017.cl/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/presentacion_de_la_segunda_entrega_de_resultados_censo
2017.pdf.
68. See Funk, supra note 10.
69. See generally AARON M. SHATZMAN, THE OLD WORLD, THE NEW WORLD,
AND THE CREATION OF THE MODERN WORLD, 1400–1650: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY
63–108 (2013).
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over their territories. Describing what happened in that historical
context in Bolivia, Diremar (Strategic Management for Maritime
Vindication) stated:
The Spanish crown established a new type of political administrative
organization in America, creating Viceroyalties and CaptainciesGeneral. The Viceroyalty of Peru was created in 1542 and was
divided into Royal Audiences, one of which was the Royal Audience
of Charcas (today Bolivia) . . . which comprised the Atacama District
and its coast as part of its jurisdiction. 70

In 1776, the Viceroyalty of Río de La Plata was created. 71
Subsequently, the Royal Audience of Charcas, including the Atacama
region, became part of its jurisdiction. 72 However, this did not last very
long. In 1782, the Viceroyalty was fragmented in diverse administrative
units, such as Potosi, which included the Atacama coastal land.73
Although the many redistributions of territorial administrative
jurisdictions, after the formation of Latin American countries, the
original territories, such as the Atacama coastal territory, originally
belonged to indigenous communities. 74 Bolivia and Chile must
recognize the injustices of the Spanish conquest and colonization of the
New World against indigenous communities and ensure the
participation of indigenous communities in the resolution of their
territorial disputes. Unlike in previous historical contexts, the rights of
indigenous peoples are globally recognized in international normative
instruments, including the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
People 75 and the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous

70. DIREMAR, supra note 44, at 24.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007).
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Peoples. 76 These international legal sources recognize the selfdetermination and sovereignty of indigenous peoples. 77
IV. THE ORIGINS OF THE BOLIVIA-CHILE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, THE
LEAGUE OF NATIONS, AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
The lack of fulfillment of bilateral treaties characterizes the
international relations between Chile and Bolivia. 78 It not only
demonstrates the close relationship between power politics and
international law, but also how power can undermine the just territorial
aspiration of military weak sovereign states such as Bolivia. 79 Since its
independence from Spain in 1865, Bolivia has had access to the Pacific
Ocean. However, it lost its territory in an unjust war with Chile.80
Recognizing the importance of access to coastal lands, in 1866, both
countries signed a bilateral treaty regarding the demarcation of their
coastal borders, 81 which was later reaffirmed in the Treaty of Limits
between Bolivia and Chile of 1874. 82
Unfortunately, in 1879, Chile started the War of the Pacific against
Bolivia and Peru and occupied Bolivia’s coastal territories. 83
Describing the end of the war and the establishment of peaceful
relations between Bolivia and Chile, the I.C.J. opined:
Hostilities between Bolivia and Chile came to an end with the Truce
Pact, signed in 1884 in Valparaíso. Under the terms of the Pact,
Chile, inter alia, was to continue to govern the coastal region. As a
76. See G.A. Res. 2888, American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (June 15, 2016).
77. See Glenn T. Morris, In Support of the Right of Self-Determination for
Indigenous Peoples under International Law, 29 GER. Y.B. INT’L L. 277, 308 (1986)
(analyzing the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples).
78. See Rossi, supra note 29.
79. See Michael C. Williams, Why Ideas Matter in International Relations:
Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics,
58 INT’L ORG. 633 (2004) (analyzing realism and power politics in international
relations).
80. See, e.g., MARK EVANS, JUST WAR THEORY: A REAPPRAISAL 203–22 (2005)
(analyzing the concepts of just and unjust wars).
81. See Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶ 16.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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result of these events, Bolivia lost control over its Pacific coast. In
1895, a Treaty on the Transfer of Territory was signed between
Bolivia and Chile, but never entered into force. It included provisions
for Bolivia to regain access to the sea, subject to Chile acquiring
sovereignty over certain territories. On 20 October 1904, the Parties
signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship . . . which officially ended
the War of the Pacific as between Bolivia and Chile. Under that
Treaty, which entered into force on 10 March 1905, the entire
Bolivian coastal territory became Chilean and Bolivia was granted a
right of commercial transit through Chilean ports. The Court notes
that, since the conclusion of the 1904 Peace Treaty, both States have
made a number of declarations and several diplomatic exchanges
have taken place between them regarding the situation of Bolivia visà-vis the Pacific Ocean. 84

The ruling elites of Bolivia and Chile disregarded the interest of
essential sectors of their populations including the original owners of
the territory under dispute. Indigenous peoples in Chile and Bolivia
were not consulted, nor did they participate in the negotiations and
conclusion of the Peace Treaty of 1904 or any other treaties regarding
the Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute. 85 Considering the socio-political
implications and economic impact of the Bolivians’ loss of its access to
the Pacific Ocean, the interests of indigenous people should have been
considered in the negotiating processes and conclusion of treaties
between Chile and Bolivia. 86
The international relations between Bolivia and Chile have failed
to follow the norms of international law, which condemn use of military
force to resolve disputes. 87 For example, on August 6, 1874, Chile and
Bolivia signed a treaty to recognize their territorial boundaries. 88 A
Protocol to this agreement selected arbitration as the means for
resolving disputes related to the treaty implementation. 89 Despite this
legal commitment, on February 14, 1879, Chile invaded Bolivian

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 1.
See id.
See infra Part V.B.
See generally DIREMAR, supra note 44.
Id. at 19.
Id.
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territory and annexed the Antofagasta port. 90 Regarding this historical
context, Diremar summarized that:
Bolivia was dragged into a conflagration it had neither sought nor
desired and, forced to defend its sovereignty, pursuant to the Treaty
of Defensive Alliance concluded with Peru in 1873, along with its
ally it tried to stop the advance of the Chilean troops which
eventually occupied all of Bolivia’s Litoral, the Peruvian provinces
of Tarapacá, Tacna and Arica and even the Peruvian capital city of
Lima. 91

A peaceful means for the resolution of the territorial dispute
happened at the League of Nations. Regarding the importance of the
resolution of its landlocked situation, Bolivia stated its case at the 1919
Paris Peace conference, and at the League of Nations. 92 In response to
this, in 1922, Manuel Rivas Vicuña, Chile’s delegate, expressed Chile’s
willingness to negotiate with Bolivia. 93
Frank B. Kellogg, who was a mediator in a territorial dispute
between Chile and Peru, attempted to resolve the Bolivia-Chile
territorial dispute. 94 On November 30, 1926, he proposed to grant
Bolivia the territories of Tacna and Arica. 95 In a memorandum sent to
Frank B. Kellogg, Chile expressed its agreement to grant a stripe of
territory and a port to Bolivia. 96
Since the late nineteenth century, the O.A.S. has provided a forum
to find a peaceful resolution to the Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute. In
1970, the O.A.S. General Assembly issued Resolution 426, which
recommended that Chile and Bolivia negotiate so Bolivia may have a
“free and sovereign territorial connection with the Pacific Ocean.” 97
90. Id. at 30.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 25 (Bolivia was a signatory of the Peace of Versailles); Treaty of
Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles, 1919), June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43, 225
Consol. T.S. 188, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust0000020043.pdf.
93. DIREMAR, supra note 44, at 25.
94. Id. at 27.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Organization of American States G.A. Res. 426, OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2
(October 22–31, 1979).
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The O.A.S. passed two other resolutions in 1980 and 1981,
recommending that Chile and Bolivia negotiate a peaceful resolution
regarding Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. 98 In 1983,
the O.A.S. General Assembly adopted Resolution 686, which both
Bolivia and Chile voted in favor of. The resolution encouraged both
countries “to begin a process of rapprochement and strengthening of
friendship of the Bolivian and Chilean peoples, directed toward
normalizing their relations and overcoming the difficulties that separate
them, including, especially, a formula for giving Bolivia a sovereign
outlet to the Pacific Ocean.” 99
It is evident that Bolivia has relied on international law, including
bilateral agreements with Chile, to resolve its lack of access to the
Pacific Ocean. Bolivia has also attempted to facilitate negotiations with
Chile through international organizations, such as the League of
Nations and the O.A.S., to resolve its territorial disputes with Chile. The
O.A.S. has continued to provide an institutional framework to find
solutions to Bolivia’s landlocked status, while taking into consideration
its historical international relations with Chile. Future efforts at the
O.A.S. should also consider the role of indigenous peoples in the
diplomatic resolution of conflicts between Bolivia and Chile.
A. The Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v.
Chile) Case at the I.C.J.
Maintaining the recent trend of pursuing negotiations of territorial
disputes through international mechanisms, Bolivia decided to initiate
proceedings before the I.C.J.to gain access to the Pacific Ocean. On
March 23, 2011, Bolivia’s first indigenous President, Evo Morales
Ayma, announced the initiation of these proceedings:
Despite 132 years of dialogue and efforts, Bolivia does not have a
sovereign access to the Pacific . . . . In recent decades[,] and
particularly in recent years, International Law has made great

98. DIREMAR, supra note 44, at 88; Organization of American States G.A. Res.
481, OEA/Ser.P/X.0.2 (Nov. 19–27, 1980); Organization of American States G.A.
Res. 560, OEA/Ser.P/XI.0.2 (Oct. 2–11, 1981).
99. Organization of American States G.A. Res. 686, OEA/Ser. P/XIII.O.2 (Nov.
14–18, 1983).
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progress; there are now tribunals and courts which sovereign States
can appeal to and claim or demand what is rightfully theirs. 100

Bolivia believed that the I.C.J. established a legal obligation for
Chile to negotiate a solution to provide Bolivia access to the Pacific
Ocean. Bolivia, a State with a weak military, relied on the legal strength
of an international adjudicatory body to persuade Chile, the more
militant State, to change its diplomatic position and agree to negotiate
a peaceful solution to the territorial dispute.
Bolivia and Chile recognized the I.C.J.’s jurisdiction over territorial
disputes in the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (“ATPS”), also
known as the “Pact of Bogotá.” 101 On April 24, 2013, Bolivia filed an
application at the I.C.J. regarding Chile’s obligation to negotiate a
solution to the territorial dispute with Bolivia.102 In its application,
Bolivia asserted that Chile had a legal obligation to negotiate Bolivia’s
sovereign access to the sea. 103 The basis for this obligation is
international “agreements, diplomatic practice and a series of
declarations attributable to [Chile’s] highest-level representatives, to
negotiate a sovereign access to the sea for Bolivia.” 104 One of Bolivia’s
main objectives was to demonstrate Chile’s “obligation to negotiate in
good faith with Bolivia in order to reach an agreement granting Bolivia
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.” 105
On July 15, 2014, Chile raised a preliminary objection to the
I.C.J.’s jurisdiction. The I.C.J. rejected Chile’s preliminary objection
by applying Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá treaty. 106 The Court
decided it had jurisdiction through the Pact of Bogotá since the case
was solely about whether Chile was obligated to negotiate with Bolivia
and whether Chile breached the treaty, and would not determine the
States’ sovereignty.

100. DIREMAR, supra note 44, at 47.
101. American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogota), Apr. 30, 1948, 30
U.N.T.S. 55, O.A.S.T.S. 17 & 16.
102. Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶ 564.
103. DIREMAR, supra note 44, at 50.
104. Id.
105. Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶ 1.
106. Id.; American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogota), supra note
101, art. XXXI.
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Bolivia’s case focused on the principle of pactum de negotiando
including the interpretation that a fundamental component of
negotiations is that they are conducted in good faith. 107 The Court ruled
against Bolivia, finding that Chile had no legal obligation to negotiate
in good faith a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean for Bolivia. 108
In its reasoning, the I.C.J. rejected Bolivia’s argument regarding
bilateral agreements as a source of Chile’s legal obligation to
negotiate. 109 Bolivia argued that Chile’s obligation was embodied in
bilateral agreements, including the minutes of a meeting between
Bolivia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chile’s Minister
Plenipotentiary (January 1920); the exchange of diplomatic notes
between Bolivia and Chile (1950) and of a memorandum from the
Chilean Ambassador to Bolivia (1961); the Charaña Declaration,
signed by the Bolivian and Chilean presidents (February 1975);
communiqués between the Chilean and Bolivians secretaries of
state(November 1986); a joint declaration between the Bolivian and
Chilean secretaries of state (February 2000); and a bilateral BoliviaChile working group’s thirteen-point agenda (2006). 110 The I.C.J. did
not find a legal obligation to negotiate Bolivia’s sovereign access to the
Pacific Ocean in any of these bilateral instruments. 111
The I.C.J. also did not find a legal obligation to negotiate with
Bolivia in Chile’s unilateral acts. 112 The I.C.J. rejected Bolivia’s
arguments based on the doctrine of acquiescence. It noted that Bolivia
“has not identified any declaration which required a response or
reaction on the part of Chile in order to prevent an obligation from

107. Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶ 48.
108. Press Release, International Court of Justice, Obligation to Negotiate
Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile): The Court Finds that the Republic of
Chile Did Not Undertake a Legal Obligation to Negotiate a Sovereign Access to the
Pacific Ocean for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, I.C.J. Press Release 2018/49, 1
(October 1, 2018) [hereinafter International Court of Justice].
109. Id. at 2.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1.
112. Id. at 2.
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arising.” 113 The Court further rejected arguments based on estoppel, 114
and stated:
Although there have been repeated representations by Chile of its
willingness to negotiate Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea, such
representations do not point to an obligation to negotiate. Bolivia has
not demonstrated that it changed its position to its own detriment or
to Chile’s advantage, in reliance on Chile’s representations. 115

The court rejected Bolivia’s arguments based on the doctrine of
legitimate expectations because it is a principle restricted to the field of
foreign direct investments between host countries and foreign
investors. 116 The I.C.J. indicated that Article 2.3 of the U.N. Charter
and Article 3 of the O.A.S. Charter express a general obligation to
resolve disputes by peaceful means, but they do not require the parties
to use a specific mechanism like negotiation. 117
Regarding the eleven O.A.S. General Assembly resolutions on the
issue of Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, the I.C.J.
reasoned: “. . . none of the relevant resolutions indicates that Chile is
under an obligation to negotiate Bolivia’s sovereign access to the
Pacific Ocean. Moreover, as both Parties acknowledge, resolutions of
the General Assembly of the OAS are not per se binding and cannot be
the source of an international obligation.” 118 The I.C.J. rejected
Bolivia’s claim regarding Chile’s legal obligation to negotiate because
of an accumulative effect of all the sources that demonstrate the
existence of such obligation. Specifically, the I.C.J. said, “given that its
analysis shows that no obligation to negotiate Bolivia’s sovereign
access to the Pacific Ocean has arisen for Chile from any of the invoked
legal bases taken individually, a cumulative consideration of the various
bases cannot add to the overall result.” 119
113. Id.
114. See generally Christopher Brown, A Comparative and Critical Assessment
of Estoppel in International Law, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 369 (1996) (explaining the
doctrine of estoppel in international law).
115. International Court of Justice, supra note 108, at 3.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 4.
119. Id.
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Contrary to its overall reasoning regarding the lack of Chile’s legal
obligation to negotiate in good faith an access to the Pacific Ocean for
Bolivia, the I.C.J. also recognized the existence of a historical conflict
between Chile and Bolivia, and the importance of having negotiations
to resolve it. Regarding this, the I.C.J. indicated:
Nevertheless, the Court’s finding should not be understood as
precluding the Parties from continuing their dialogue and exchanges,
in a spirit of good neighborliness, to address the issues relating to the
landlocked situation of Bolivia, the solution to which they have both
recognized to be a matter of mutual interest. With willingness on the
part of the Parties, meaningful negotiations can be undertaken.120

As a matter of common interest, the I.C.J.’s recognition of the
historical efforts to resolve the landlocked problem of Bolivia and its
encouragement to continue to address this issue provides a foundation
for seeking original and effective means for the peaceful resolution of
the Bolivia-Chile conflict. Besides adjudicatory means, in the
resolution of international disputes there are other mechanisms for the
peaceful resolution of conflicts, including mediation and conciliation,
which will be considered in this Article.
B. Dissenting Opinions and the Negotiation Option
Regarding the decision of the Bolivia-Chile case, the President of
the I.C.J., Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf, recognized the existence of
historically consistent interactions and declarations between Chile and
Bolivia. He believed these actions reflected efforts, made in good faith,
to obtain a negotiated solution to Bolivia’s landlocked problem.121
Consistent with this view, in his declaration in the case records, he
wrote:
It is possible, as is the case here, that the Court may reject the relief
requested by an applicant because it is not sufficiently founded on
law. This may satisfy the judicial function of the Court, but it may
not put to an end the issues which divide the Parties or remove all the
uncertainties affecting their relations. It is not inappropriate, in such
120. Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶ 564.
121. Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶¶ 566–68 (Oct. 1) (Declaration of
President Yusuf).
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circumstances, for the Court to draw the attention of the Parties to
the possibility of exploring or continuing to explore other avenues
for the settlement of their dispute in the interest of peace and
harmony amongst them. 122

Consistent with his written statement, Judge Yusuf also made a
public statement in which he highlighted the fact that the I.C.J.
recognized the existence of a history of negotiations between Chile and
Bolivia to resolve the landlocked Bolivian problem. 123 He said that “for
the Court, these periodic exchanges and statements of the Parties
reflected attempts made in good faith to address the landlocked
situation of Bolivia.” 124 Considering the resolution of the territorial
dispute is of mutual interests of Chile and Bolivia, he opined: “This
recognition by the Parties of the importance of the issue, paired with
their willingness to resolve it, may provide the basis for a meaningful
solution to be identified in the future.” 125
Judge Yusuf recognized that the decision of the I.C.J. was limited
to the arguments presented in the case. The most important part of the
declaration recognizes that the positivist legal analysis of the I.C.J. did
not end the territorial dispute between Bolivia and Chile, and that the
I.C.J. properly requested both countries to continue to find a mechanism
for the resolution of their territorial dispute.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Patrick Lipton Robinson
recognized Chile’s legal obligation to negotiate a solution to the
territorial dispute regarding Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific
Ocean. 126 He believes that the historical agreements between the
parties, including the Trucco Memorandum and the Declaration of
Charaña, are evidence of the creation of a legal obligation for Chile to

122. Id. at 567.
123. H.E. Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf, President of the International Court of
Justice, Speech at the 71st Session of the International Law Commission (July 11,
2019), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/press-releases/0/000-20190711-STA-0100-EN.pdf.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶¶ 569–98 (Oct. 1) (Dissenting Opinion
of Robinson, J.), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/153/153-20181001JUD-01-02-EN.pdf.
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negotiate with Bolivia. 127 Consistent with this reasoning, he wrote the
I.C.J. “should therefore have granted Bolivia a declaration that Chile
has a legal obligation to negotiate directly with Bolivia to find a formula
or solution that will enable Bolivia to have sovereign access to the
Pacific Ocean.” 128
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Nawaf Salam analyzed the
exchange of notes, between Bolivia and Chile, as a means to create an
international agreement. 129 He wrote that like in the Qatar v. Bahrain
case, the I.C.J. should have recognized the formation of an international
agreement by the exchange of diplomatic notes between Bolivia and
Chile. 130 Contrary to the reasoning of the majority opinion, Judge
Salam believes that documents including the Trucco Memorandum and
the Charaña Declaration, are evidence that “Chile and Bolivia were
bound by a consistent obligation to negotiate on granting the latter
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.” 131 He used the Qatar v. Bahrain
case as an example of the fact that international agreements can be done
in diverse forms. 132 According to Judge Salam:
It is evident from the wording of the Notes exchanged that, at the
time they were drafted, the two States considered that negotiations
with a view to concluding an agreement that would confer reciprocal
benefits on both Parties were the only feasible way of attempting to
satisfy Bolivia’s aspirations. It is also clear from the terms of the
Notes that they express the core of the undertaking to which the
Parties had consented, namely to ‘formally enter into direct
negotiations.’ 133

127. Id. at 598.
128. Id.
129. Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶¶ 599–606 (Oct. 1) (Dissenting Opinion
of Salam, J.), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/153/153-20181001JUD-01-03-EN.pdf.
130. See Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgement, 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 40 (March 15), available at
https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/87/087-19911011-ORD-01-00EN.pdf (discussing the reasoning of the I.C.J. in the Qatar v. Bahrain case).
131. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Salam, supra note 129, at 604.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 601.
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Regarding the importance of continuing to negotiate a solution to
the Bolivia-Chile dispute, ad hoc Judge Yves Daudet highlighted that
the I.C.J. decision recognizes the international dispute regarding
Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean is a pending issue.
Concerning paragraph 176 of the I.C.J. decision which expresses this
view, he wrote:
[T]he Court’s concern is that the dispute should not persist and that
its decision should not be understood as being the end of the matter,
allowing things to remain as they are. In this regard, while hard for
Bolivia, the Judgment could, if the Parties so wish, prompt a return
to negotiations, which would not be imposed but desired by both
sides with a renewed spirit. 134

The I.C.J. judges’ dissenting opinions in the Obligation to
Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile) case and
paragraph 176 of the I.C.J. decision demonstrate the importance of
continuing diplomatic negotiations between Chile and Bolivia to find a
solution to Bolivia’s landlocked problem. Mediation and conciliation
are possible mechanisms to accomplish this objective. In the next
section of this Article, I will analyze the efficacy of alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms for the Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute.
V. AN INTEGRATIVE NORMATIVE APPROACH FOR THE RESOLUTION OF
THE BOLIVIA-CHILE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE
Considering the complex historical and political characteristics of
the Bolivia-Chile conflict and the failure of the I.C.J.’s legal positivism
approach to contribute to its resolution, fundamental principles of
global justice including ex aequo et bono need to become a foundation
for its resolution. Regarding this principle, Leon Trakman, an
experienced international relations law professor, opined that “[t]he
ancient concept ex aequo et bono holds that adjudicators should decide
disputes according to that which is ‘fair’ and in ‘good conscience.’”135
Specifically, in international law, “[i]f the adjudicative decision is to be
134. Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶ 620 (Oct. 1) (Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Ad Hoc Daudet), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/153/15320181001-JUD-01-04-EN.pdf.
135. Leon Trakman, Ex Aequo et Bono: Demystifying an Ancient Concept, 8
CHI. J. INT’L L. 621, 621 (2008).
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‘fair,’ it must be fair against the background of rational actors
exercising their free will.” 136
Consistent with rational ideas of fairness, Chile and Bolivia have
an obligation consistent with their national interests to obtain a solution
to Bolivia’s landlocked situation. This is also consistent with
fundamental principles of global justice, including the peaceful
coexistence between sovereign states, and respect for fundamental,
individual, and collective human rights. 137 To diminish the mutual
distrust between Bolivia and Chile, and to accomplish objectives
consistent with global justice, the interests of indigenous peoples and
civil sectors of society of both countries, must be considered. Moreover,
any possibility of a violent resolution to this conflict must be
prevented. 138
Consistent with Article 2(3) of the U.N. Charter, rather than relying
on power politics and the potential use of military force, Chile and
Bolivia have the legal obligation to resolve their dispute through
peaceful means. 139 As mentioned above, Article 33 of the U.N. Charter
requires sovereign states to resolve their disputes through peaceful
means including negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and
judicial settlement. 140
The failure of the I.C.J. to contribute to a negotiated solution to a
territorial dispute is evidence of the importance of considering
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in the resolution of
international disputes between sovereign states. 141 A case can be made
for rethinking the structure of international dispute resolution by
focusing not only on adjudicatory mechanism, but also on mediation,
conciliation, and other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. This

136. Id. at 637.
137. See RATNER, supra note 36 (describing global justice principles).
138. See generally Wehner, supra note 14 (discussing the effect of distrust on
the Boliva-Chile dispute).
139. U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶ 3.
140. Id. art 33.
141. See generally Anna Spain, Integration Matters: Rethinking the
Architecture of International Dispute Resolution, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010)
(discussing the potential resolution of international disputes through alternative
resolution mechanisms).
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analysis applies well to the case of the Bolivia-Chile territorial
dispute. 142
A glaring flaw in the current international dispute resolution system
is that “it overlooks the value and institutional development of
mediation, despite states’ preference for mediation in certain
contexts.” 143 Also, it does not have a structure to enable the integration
of diverse methods of dispute resolution. 144 Regarding the shortfalls of
adjudicatory means for the resolution of international disputes:
[A]djudication is not designed to address extra-legal issues. Its
limited justiciability makes adjudication poorly equipped to resolve
complex, multi-issue disputes involving political, social,
environmental, and ethical interests. Often a court will issue an
opinion that fails to resolve key issues in the case. 145

The limitations of the international adjudicatory process were seen
in the I.C.J.’s decision in the Bolivia-Chile case, which did not provide
adequate solutions for the resolution of one of the most important
territorial disputes in Latin America. 146 Considering this reality, it is
essential to find just and creative mechanisms for the resolution of the
Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute, including the integration of diverse
means. To illustrate of the effectiveness of an integrative approach:
[I]n the [I.C.J.] Frontier Dispute case, the governments of Mali and
Burkina Faso reached a cease-fire and worked to resolve their
underlying disputes through judicial settlement by the [I.C.J.] and a
mediation like process that involved local stakeholders. This

142. Id.
143. Id. at 13.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 16–17 (“For example, despite the ICJ’s decision regarding Slovakia
and Hungary’s dispute over a project to build barrages in the Danube River, the matter
remains unresolved. In the Nuclear Tests cases, and other cases, the ICJ was heavily
criticized for leaving the question of legality of nuclear testing, a politicized matter,
undecided, and for failing to identify legal principles upon which environmental
protection could be based.”).
146. See generally Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶ 564.
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combination of rights-based and interest-based methods brought an
end to the armed conflict and the ongoing disputes. 147

In paragraph 176 of the Obligation to Negotiate Access to the
Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile) case opinion, the I.C.J. encouraged
Chile and Bolivia to continue their negotiations to find a solution to
Bolivia’s landlocked situation. 148 This perspective is further supported
by the reasoning of Judge Yusuf and the dissenting judges’ opinions in
the Bolivia v. Chile case. The I.C.J. can encourage a diplomatic solution
to the territorial dispute by implementing an international mediation
process between the two countries.
The I.C.J. decision demonstrates the Court’s limitations in
providing effective solutions consistent with international law. In order
to make the international dispute resolution system more effective, the
focus must be shifted to “embracing mediation and reducing the
primacy of adjudication removes some authority from states as it
promotes non-state actor participation in IDR processes. An integrated
[International Dispute Resolution (“IDR”)] structure creates a
decentralized substructure within the international legal system.”149
Consistent with the integrative approach for international conflicts, the
Inter-American system for dispute resolution provides a normative
foundation for the peaceful resolution of the Bolivia-Chile territorial
dispute. This foundation includes mediation, assistance, and
conciliation.
Bolivia and Chile are signatories to the American Treaty on Pacific
Settlement (“ATPS”). 150 In Article IX, this treaty recognizes good
offices and mediation as means for conflict resolution, such as the
Bolivia-Chile conflict. 151 Countries, such as Costa Rica, which
traditionally have facilitated the peaceful resolution of international
conflicts can attempt to reinvigorate the negotiation between Bolivia
and Chile. Pope Francis is an Argentinian citizen who knows the
147. Spain, supra note 140, at 7.
148. Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶ 564.
149. Spain, supra note 141, at 49.
150. Organization of American States, Signatories and Ratifications to the
American
Treaty
on
Pacific
Settlement,
DEPT.
INT’L
L.,
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-42.html.
151. See American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogota), supra note
101, art. IX.
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historical, political, and cultural characteristics of Bolivia and Chile.152
He could utilize good offices to help Chile and Bolivia negotiate a
peaceful solution to their territorial dispute. ATPS provides a
foundation for Latin American countries to facilitate a mediated
resolution of the Bolivia-Chile conflict. Regarding mediation as a
means for the conflict resolution, Article XI of the ATPS states:
The procedure of mediation consists in the submission of the
controversy to one or more American Governments not parties to the
controversy, or to one or more eminent citizens of any American
State not a party to the controversy. In either case the mediator or
mediators shall be chosen by mutual agreement between the
parties. 153

Bolivia and Chile can agree to have Pope Francis, or other
distinguished citizens of Latin America, act as mediators for their
territorial disputes. 154 Specifically, countries such as Costa Rica or
Mexico can be mediators in the Bolivia-Chile dispute. Describing the
functions of mediators, Article XII of the ATPS provides, “The
functions of the mediator or mediators shall be to assist the parties in
the settlement of controversies in the simplest and most direct manner,
avoiding formalities and seeking an acceptable solution.” 155
An integrative approach to the resolution of the Bolivia-Chile
territorial conflict must recognize the I.C.J.’s inherent limitations and
embrace other means for international dispute resolution. Mediation,
conciliation, and good offices are alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms that will effectively resolve the Bolivia-Chile dispute.
Further, an integrative perspective is consistent with the norms of the
ATPS that recognize the importance of mediation, conciliation, and
other alternative dispute resolution processes for the resolution of
disagreements between Latin American countries.

152. See MARTIN SCHLAG, THE BUSINESS FRANCIS
THE POPE’S MESSAGE ON THE ECONOMY 48–97 (2017).

MEANS: UNDERSTANDING

153. American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogota), supra note 101,
art. XI.
154. SCHLAG, supra note 152, at 48–97.
155. American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogota), supra note 101,
art. XII.
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A. Pope Francis and U.N. Secretary General António Guterres as
Mediators of the Bolivia-Chile Territorial Dispute
Mediation is defined as “a form of third-party intervention by
which an unbiased party convenes disputing parties, facilitates a
process for communicating positions and underlying interests and
promotes agreement formation.” 156 Mediation has been an effective
mechanism for national and international dispute resolution. Further, it
is a major means for the resolution of disputes between those from
different cultures. 157 Additionally, mediation is an important method
for the resolution of business disputes between juridical persons,
including transnational corporations. For example, the Center of the
Settlement of Investment Disputes uses mediation to resolve conflicts
between transnational corporations and governments. 158 Although not
as frequently as in the business sector, mediation is also used in the
resolution of territorial and other disputes between sovereign states. For
example, consider China and Russia during the In the Amur River
Dispute:
[T]he underlying issue was an unclear boundary demarcation along
a portion of the Amur River and several islands. Russia claimed that
ownership rights were granted under the 1858 Treaty of Adigun and
the 1860 Peking Treaty. Although seemingly a legal matter, the
parties resolved the dispute through a joint field-mapping exercise of
the disputed area where they agreed to divide the islands in half. The
process, which involved mediation, worked so well that they
followed a similar arrangement in the Argun River Dispute. 159

From another perspective, philosopher Paul Ricouer suggests the
use of historical memory to facilitate mediation processes. 160 This
perspective applies well to the Bolivia-Chile conflict because there is a
156. Spain, supra note 141, at 10.
157. Elizabeth Birch, Practical and Cultural Aspects of International
Mediation, 5 Y.B. ON INT’L ARB. 215, 216 (2017).
158. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Investor-State
BANK
GROUP,
Mediation,
Subpage
to
Services,
WORLD
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/adr-mechanisms—mediation.aspx (last
visited Oct. 17, 2020).
159. Spain, supra note 141, at 25–26.
160. See ZWIER, supra note 45, at 124–25 (discussing Paul Ricouer).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2020

33

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1 [2020], Art. 3
Updated_Mantilla camera ready (Do Not Delete)

62

1/11/2021 10:50 AM

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51

well-documented negotiating history regarding the peaceful solution of
Bolivia’s landlocked condition. The importance of historical memory
can also be seen in the fact that both countries have a common history
of unity before the Spanish conquest and colonization of the New
World. Specifically, the Incas and other indigenous peoples were the
original inhabitants of Chile and Bolivia. 161
Both countries have experienced military dictatorships acts of
genocide against indigenous communities. Bolivia and Chile have
experienced processes of national reconciliation and restoration of their
respective democratic systems. Historical memory may remind
Bolivians and Chileans, and their governments, that negotiations are
meaningful steps toward a mutually beneficial agreement. 162
Regarding the principle approach to international negotiations and
mediation, “[n]egotiation theorist[s] . . . emphasize an interest-based
approach to negotiations instead of position bargaining . . . to focus on
the underlying concerns of the parties instead of [focusing on] a
defined, sometimes uncompromising objective.” 163 Consistent with the
principle approach, Bolivia and Chile should focus on the political and
economic importance of improving their bilateral relations. Both
countries must also understand their common destiny to live as
neighboring countries, and they must acknowledge the fact that their
territorial disputes have damaged mutually beneficial processes of
economic integration.
Mutual political forgiveness and reconciliation are fundamental
factors in achieving a successful result in the Bolivia-Chile dispute.
Specifically, success requires the participation of government officials,
indigenous leaders, and civil society representatives in mediation
processes. Public diplomacy should be an essential component in these
types of efforts. Further, public diplomacy is essential to dispute
resolution efforts. Indigenous leaders from both countries can begin
this process by showing a willingness to speak sincerely about
indigenous interests. Similarly, academic leaders, scientists, and

161. MCEWAN, supra note 52, at 3.
162. See ZWIER, supra note 45, at 126–43 (discussing using the integration of a
historical approach, position bargaining and problem solving in international
mediation processes).
163. Id. at 126.
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business leaders can also promote indigenous interests. 164 An
international institution can act as a mediator, facilitating a mutual and
proper understanding of the interests of Bolivia and Chile. The U.N.,
the O.A.S., and the Catholic Church are examples of potential
mediators.
Pope Francis, given his understanding of the South American
context and the importance of indigenous peoples in the region, is
uniquely situated to mediate the territorial dispute between Bolivia and
Chile. The Secretary General of the U.N., António Guterres, could also
be an excellent impartial mediator for the conflict. The Beagle Channel
case is a good example of a successful South America territorial dispute
mediation:
The Beagle Channel conflict had its origins in a long-standing
disagreement over the contours of the Argentine–Chilean border.
The core issue in this dispute was sovereignty over three barren
islands to the south of Tierra del Fuego and the scope of the maritime
jurisdiction associated with those islands. 165

The Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute centers on Bolivia’s sovereign
access to the Pacific Ocean. Similarly, in the Beagle Channel dispute,
military dictatorships in Chile and Argentina leveraged their territorial
conflict to increase their domestic political influence by encouraging
nationalist feelings and denigrating their opponent’s cultural and
national identities. Additionally, geopolitical interests increased the
conflict’s intensity. Indeed, “The military authorities of both countries
had long regarded the southern zone as crucial to their long-term
strategic objectives because of its three interoceanic passages—the
Straits of Magellan, the Beagle Channel, and the Drake Passage.” 166

164. See generally Nicholas J. Cull, Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and
Histories, 616 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 31–54 (2008) (analyzing
public diplomacy).
165. Mark Laudy, The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis
Intervention and Forum Building, in WORD OVER WAR, MEDIATION AND
ARBITRATION TO PREVENT DEADLY CONFLICT 295 (Melanie C. Greenberg, et. al,
eds., 2000).
166. Id. at 298.
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Just as the Bolivia-Chile dispute, the Beagle Channel territorial dispute
was a central priority of both countries’ foreign policies. 167
Before the Pope’s mediation of the Argentina-Chile dispute (19711977), there was an arbitration process done by the British Crown.
Specifically, “[t]he arbitral decision, officially announced on May 2,
1977, established a boundary running roughly through the center of the
Beagle Channel and extending to the east of the PNL island group.
Thus, all three of the disputed islands were awarded to Chile.”168
However, Argentina rejected the decision of the arbitral panel and
declared it void.
Chile rejected the British Crown’s decision. This increased tensions
between the two countries. Military force became an increasingly likely
resolution of the conflict. 169 Chile sought a resolution by the I.C.J.
However, Argentina, as a stronger military power, rejected this option
and indicated that it might declare war if Chile seeks the I.C.J.’s
assistance. 170
Pope Francis can appoint a personal envoy for good offices for the
resolution of the Bolivia-Chile conflict. In the historical context of the
Argentina-Chile conflict, Pope John Paul II sent a personal envoy to
Buenos Aires and Santiago for good offices. 171 A similar approach can
be used to resolve the Bolivia-Chile conflict. Although a number of
possible mediators were considered including, the king of Spain; Queen
of England; and the Secretary General of the U.N., Kurt Waldheim,
Pope John Paul II was elected as the best mediator for the ArgentinaChile conflict. 172
One reason Pope John Paul II was the best mediator was because
of the institutional reputation of the Vatican to have patience,
understanding, and prudence in mediating processes. 173 Moreover,
167. Id. (“By the time of the papal intervention in late 1978, the conflict over
the Beagle Channel had become the primary foreign policy imperative of both
governments.”).
168. Id. at 299.
169. Id. at 300.
170. Id. at 301 (“Chile once again proposed that the dispute be submitted to the
International Court of Justice. The unofficial response from Buenos Aires was that
Argentina would consider that course of action to be casus belli.”).
171. Id. at 302.
172. Id. at 304.
173. Id.
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“[t]he Pope, having a long-term perspective on his mission and being
largely unaccountable to any interested constituencies, was almost
certainly better suited to such a role than other heads of state.”174
Considering the personal attributes of Pope Francis, and the
institutional experience of the Vatican, the analysis regarding the
reasons why the Pope John Paul II was chosen to mediate the ChileArgentina conflict, may similarly apply to Pope Francis to resolve the
Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute.
Similar to the Chile-Argentina conflict, the mediator of the BoliviaChile conflict needs to have a deep understanding of the interests of
both parties and needs to facilitate an increasing understanding of
opposite interests of the parties in the conflict. 175 The more Chile
understands the Bolivian perspective, and Bolivia understands the
Chilean perspective, the better the possibilities for the resolution of the
conflict. The mediation process can create new value that benefits both
sides. 176
A proper and mutual understanding of the issues was a central
element of the success of the Argentina-Chile mediation. 177 Like in the
Beagle Channel case, the Vatican can initiate a good offices process to
facilitate dialogue between Bolivia and Chile. The Vatican’s experience
in mediating international disputes and Pope Francis’ South American
origins, uniquely position the Vatican to provide good offices to
facilitate Bolivia-Chile negotiations. 178
Another essential element of the successful mediation of the
Argentina-Chile Beagle Channel dispute was Pope John Paul’s
neutrality. 179 Through his neutral mediation there came a mutually

174. Id. at 304.
175. See generally GARY FRIEDMAN & JACK HIMMELSTEIN, CHALLENGING
CONFLICT, MEDIATION THROUGH UNDERSTANDING (2008) (discussing the
importance of the understanding perspective regarding mediation of conflicts).
176. See generally ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, BEYOND WINNING, NEGOTIATING TO
CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000) (providing a general analysis of the
negotiation and the creations of value).
177. See Laudy, supra note 165, at 310.
178. See generally ALYNNA J. LYON, CHRISTINE A. GUSTAFSON & PAUL
CHRISTOPHER MANUEL (EDS.), POPE FRANCIS AS A GLOBAL ACTOR WHERE POLITICS
AND THEOLOGY MEET (2018) (analyzing Pope Francis’ views and actions).
179. Lisa Lindsley, The Beagle Channel Settlement: Vatican Mediation
Resolves a Century-Old Dispute, 29 J. CHURCH & ST. 435, 453 (1987); see also
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beneficial agreement. The agreement recognized Argentine ships’
rights to passage, through internal waters of Chile, to the Strait of
Magellan. 180 A similar approach that implements the negotiating
objectives of Bolivia and Chile can lead to a peaceful resolution of their
territorial disputes.
The global recognition of Pope John Paul II and the influence and
perceived neutrality of the Catholic Church in Latin American countries
were some reasons for the effective mediation of the Pope in the
territorial dispute between Chile and Argentina on the Beagle
Channel. 181 “Pope John Paul II formally accepted the role of mediator
on the basis that the Vatican would be a mediator not an arbiter; he
pledged to ‘advise and assist’ the nations to reach an agreement. The
Vatican was not empowered to judge the merits of the case.” 182 In the
current Latin America historical context, the Catholic Church can be an
important factor in the resolution of the Bolivia-Chile conflict because
Pope Francis has globally recognized moral authority and influence. 183
In November 2019, the Secretary General of the U.N. António
Guterres, sent his personal representative, Jean Arnault, to mediate a
political crisis in Bolivia. 184 The conflicts between political forces that
supported President Evo Morales and opposition forces could have
ended in a tragic civil war. 185 However, thanks to the mediation efforts
of the Bolivian Catholic Church, the U.N., and the European Union, all
parties of the conflict—including leaders of the political party
Movement for Socialism (“M.A.S.”), such as the President of the
Thomas Princen, International Mediation - The View from the Vatican, 3 NEGOT. J.
347 (1987).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 443.
182. Id. at 445.
183. See Lyon, Gustafson & Manuel, supra note 178 (analyzing Pope Francis’
views and actions).
184. Statement, Mr. Jean Arnault of France - Personal Envoy of the SecretaryGeneral for Bolivia, U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL (Nov. 14, 2019),
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/personnel-appointments/2019-11-14/mr-jeanarnault-of-france-personal-envoy-of-the-secretary-general-for-bolivia.
185. See, e.g., Anatoly Kurmanaev, Mónica Machicao & Ernesto Londoño,
Military Calls on President to Step Down After Election Dispute in Bolivia, N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
13,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/10/world/americas/bolivia-election-evomorales.html (discussing the Bolivia political crisis).
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Senate, Ms. Eva Copa, and members of movements that overthrown
President Evo Morales, including President Jeanine Añez—reached an
agreement to have new presidential elections in Bolivia.186
Consequently, the U.N. Secretary General could also offer good offices
and could lead mediation efforts in the Bolivia-Chile territorial
dispute. 187
U.N. Secretary Generals have been involved, using good offices, in
resolution of international conflicts including the Cuban missile crisis,
the Yemeni civil war, Iran-Iraq war, Afghanistan war, and Cambodian
civil war. 188 For example, the U.N. Secretary Generals’ good offices’
joint efforts with the O.A.S. in the Esquipulas II process was essential
resolving conflicts in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
and Nicaragua. 189 The U.N. and O.A.S. helped establish an agreement
that included procedures and objectives for negotiations between the
parties to the conflicts. Also, the U.N. and the O.A.S. were granted the
authority to pursue the implementation of agreements reached as a
result of the negotiation processes. 190
Another example of the U.N. Secretary General’s mediation efforts
in Latin America occurred in Guatemala. 191 Guatemala’s civil war was
one of the most violent in the region and resulted in the death of around
one hundred thousand people and thousands of disappearances. 192 In
1990, representatives of the U.N. Secretary General started to mediate
186. Daniel Ramos, Bolivia’s dueling parties converge on new vote to calm
political chaos, REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/usbolivia-election/bolivias-dueling-parties-converge-on-new-vote-to-calm-politicalchaos-idUSKBN1XO2C8.
187. See Thomas M. Franck, The Secretary-General’s Role in Conflict
Resolution: Past, Present and Pure Conjecture, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 360, 361 (1995)
(regarding the authority of the U.N. Secretary General to contribute to the resolution
of international disputes).
188. Id.
189. Permanent Rep. of Costa Rica to the U.N., Permanent Rep. of El Salvador
to the U.N., Permanent Rep. of Guatemala to the U.N., & Permanent Rep. of
Nicaragua to the U.N., Letter dated 27 August 1987 from the Permanent
Representatives of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/42/521, S/19085 (Aug. 31,
1987).
190. Franck, supra note 187, at 368–70.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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negotiations for the resolution of the conflict between the government
of Guatemala and insurgency groups. 193 These mediated negotiations
bore fruit “[i]n January 1994, [when] the adversaries, negotiating under
the Secretary-General’s auspices, had concluded a framework
agreement which also provided for the UN to moderate future
negotiations and verify compliance.” 194
As a result of the request, by sovereign states engaged in
international disputes, the U.N. Secretary General established good
offices efforts in the Rainbow Warrior case, the Guyana-Venezuela
territorial dispute, the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, and in the
Liberian conflict, among others. 195 In the Bolivia-Chile conflict, the
parties to the territorial dispute can request the U.N. Secretary General
to mediate negotiations to free Bolivia from being landlocked.
Chile has often expressed concerns for the protection of its national
sovereignty and territorial integrity in efforts to resolve Bolivia’s
landlocked situation. 196 The U.N. Secretary General’s involvement in
mediation could reduce this apprehension. In regard to the Secretary
General’s contributions are significant because they were “the least
intrusive, least expensive and frequently most successful form of UN
peace-making has proven to be the diplomatic role of the SecretaryGeneral.” 197
Mediation and other mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of the
Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute should be based on principles of global
justice, including the equality of sovereign states and respect for
fundamental human rights. Mediators that understand the interests of
governments, the interests of civil society actors, and the indigenous
peoples of Chile and Bolivia can help achieve a resolution rooted in
global justice. The Beagle Channel mediation was successful because
the moral authority of Pope John Paul II as the mediator. The
Argentinian and Chilean people recognized the leadership and
neutrality of the Pope, which created a strong public opinion support

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id. at 369–70.
Id. at 370, 379.
See, e.g., DIREMAR, supra note 44, at 37.
Franck, supra note 187, at 383.
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for a peaceful resolution. The Bolivia-Chile conflict can be successfully
resolved by taking a similar approach to mediation. 198
B. Indigenous Peoples’ Diplomacy and International Conciliation as
Necessary for the Resolution of the Bolivia-Chile Territorial Dispute
According to the Preamble to the American Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples:
[Recognizing] the rights of indigenous peoples are both essential and
of historical significance to the present and future of the Americas;
the important presence in the Americas of indigenous peoples and
their immense contribution to development, plurality, and cultural
diversity, and reiterating our commitment to their economic and
social well-being, as well as the obligation to respect their rights and
cultural identity; and that the existence of the indigenous cultures and
peoples of the Americas is important to humanity. 199

The acknowledgment of the contributions of indigenous peoples of
Latin America to the well-being of humankind, is a corollary that
should also apply to the importance of indigenous peoples in leading
public diplomacy efforts for the resolution of the Bolivia-Chile
territorial dispute. Indigenous peoples in the Andean region of Latin
American are fundamental actors in processes of social and economic
development. They also ensure the existence of diverse and
multicultural societies and are a source of strength for democratic
institutions. Therefore, Bolivia and Chile should utilize the innovative
and democratic ideas of indigenous peoples to negotiate a solution to
their territorial dispute.
As part of resolving their long-lasting territorial conflict, Bolivia
and Chile could design new and creative solutions. To facilitate a proper
analysis of these proposals, a conciliation commission can be
established. Conciliation as an alternative dispute resolution
mechanism “implies a more in depth study of the dispute as compared
to mediation, combined with the independence of the third party as it is
found in adjudication, but aiming for amicable settlement in a

198. Laudy, supra note 165, at 317.
199. G.A. Res. 2888, supra note 76 ¶ 3.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2020

41

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1 [2020], Art. 3
Updated_Mantilla camera ready (Do Not Delete)

70

1/11/2021 10:50 AM

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51

nonbinding manner instead of producing a binding finding of the
law.” 200
If Bolivia and Chile cannot resolve their pending conflict by
bilateral negotiations, then a conciliation commission can facilitate its
resolution. Leading experts, who represent the national interests of both
countries—including indigenous peoples and civil society
organizations—can be part of a Bolivian-Chilean Conciliation
Commission. Article XV of the ATPS defines conciliation as:
The procedure of investigation and conciliation consists in the
submission of the controversy to a Commission of Investigation and
Conciliation, which shall be established in accordance with the
provisions established in subsequent articles of the present Treaty,
and which shall function within the limitations prescribed therein.201

For a successful effort, the members of the commission, from each
country, must have high credentials, including an understanding of
indigenous peoples’ interests, history, and languages. There is also a
need to ensure the participation of academics, from both countries, that
have the highest levels of knowledge regarding the territorial dispute
and can provide creative solutions for its resolution. 202
One of the mandates of the commission can be the submission of
proposals regarding solutions for sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean
for Bolivia. Similarly, in the drafting of these proposals, the
commission should also consider strategies to ensure the participation
of indigenous communities, of both countries, in the negotiations and
implementation of agreements between the parties. The commission
should also consider relevant general principles of the law of sea that
are reflected in the Convention on the Law of the Sea and in customary
international law. Further, the commission should analyze the
historical, economic, ethnic, cultural, normative, and political factors
that can contribute to resolve the conflict. Besides conciliation

200. SVEN M.G. KOOPMANS, DIPLOMATIC DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, THE USE OF
INTER-STATE CONCILIATION 37 (2008).
201. See American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogota), supra note
101, art. XV.
202. See generally G.A. Res. 50/50, United Nations Model Rules for the
Conciliation of Disputes between States (Jan. 29, 1996) (The Model Rules can be used
to facilitate the working of the Bolivia-Chile Conciliation Commission).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol51/iss1/3

42

Mantilla: Indigenous Peoples’ Diplomacy, Mediation, and Conciliation as a R
Updated_Mantilla camera ready (Do Not Delete)

1/11/2021 10:50 AM

2020] INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ & THE I.C.J.’S BOLIVIA V. CHILE CASE 71
commissions, systematic public diplomacy efforts should be an
essential component in the resolution of the Bolivia-Chile territorial
dispute.
The conflicts in Bolivia and Chile, which resulted in dramatic
changes in both countries, shows the importance of civil society in the
political processes. In the case of Bolivia, the government of President
Evo Morales, which led the efforts at the I.C.J., was overthrown. 203 In
the case of Chile, President Sebastián Piñera, who claimed an important
victory of on behalf of his country in the Bolivia-Chile case at the I.C.J.,
has become one of the most unpopular presidents in the history of
Chile. 204 Popular protests against the economic policies of Mr. Piñera
resulted in a call for a referendum to change the constitution of Chile.205
In Bolivia, there will new elections for president, vice-president, and
members of congress. 206
Considering the strength of civil society movements in Bolivia and
Chile, civil societies should be the main actors in taking initiatives to
invent creative solutions for the territorial conflict. Civil society
organizations can establish bi-national committees to create proposals
that can eventually be used by a Conciliation Commission established
by the governments of Bolivia and Chile. Academic institutions in both
states can establish conciliatory commissions to draft original proposals
for the resolution of the territorial dispute. Indigenous peoples’
organizations can do the same.
Historically, the governments of Chile and Bolivia did not properly
address issues regarding the political participation, cultural protection
and economic development of indigenous communities. As part of the
203. Clarke, supra note 17; see also Paola Flores & Carlos Valdez, Bolivia’s
president Evo Morales resigns amid election-fraud allegations, deadly protests, USA
TODAY
(Nov.
11,
2019),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2019/11/10/evo-morales-boliviapresident-resigns-amid-protests-allegations/2557032001/.
204. See Sherwood, supra note 21.
205. Natalia A. Ramos Miranda, Chile’s Pinera inks law for vote on new
constitution, REUTERS (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chileprotests-constitution/chiles-pinera-inks-law-for-vote-on-new-constitutionidUSKBN1YR1S8.
206. Daniel Ramos, Bolivia’s dueling parties converge on new vote to calm
political chaos, REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/usbolivia-election/bolivias-dueling-parties-converge-on-new-vote-to-calm-politicalchaos-idUSKBN1XO2C8.
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ruling elites’ actions, Bolivia and Chile were engaged in several
conflicts including the Pacific War. 207 These actions did not reflect the
will, nor did they consider the best interests, of the Aymara, Mapuche,
Quechua, and other indigenous peoples. Considering that ruling elites
of Chile and Bolivia have not been able to resolve the territorial disputes
between their countries, the governments should instead consider and
apply the proposals of indigenous peoples and civil society actors
regarding the resolution of territorial disputes.
Through the history of diplomatic negotiations, between Chile and
Bolivia, there has been a constant failure to achieve a resolution to the
territorial dispute between these countries. The Chilean government has
made several unilateral promises regarding its will to find a peaceful
resolution of the conflict. 208 Bolivian governments have not been
capable of ensuring the resolution of the conflict. Bolivia and Chile
have not consulted and engaged indigenous peoples and civil society
actors in negotiation processes, nor in the development of diplomatic
strategies for the peaceful resolution of territorial conflicts. This
situation needs to be remedied by ensuring that, in the future,
indigenous people and civil society actors play a central role in the
peaceful resolution of the Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute.
In the process of creating conciliatory commissions at the civil
society level, it is important to remember that Bolivia is one of the most
indigenous countries in Latin America. According to the World Bank,
there are 4.12 million indigenous people which is 41% of the Bolivian
population. 209 Chile also has an important indigenous population.
According to Chilean Census, 12.8% of the population identify as
indigenous, and there are 2.185 million indigenous people. 210 This
includes the Mapuche (79.8%), Aymara (7.2%), and Diaguita
(4.1%). 211
The indigenous communities of Bolivia and Chile should be a key
part of conciliation commissions with the participation of the Aymara,
Mapuche, Quechua, and other indigenous peoples. The Bolivian and
Chilean governments should consider the economic and cultural
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

DIREMAR, supra note 44.
Id.
WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 42, at 25.
Id.
INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ESTADÍSTICA, supra note 67.
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interests of the original owners of the territories under dispute. This
could include the possibility of creating a join administration, of
territories under dispute, by indigenous peoples of both countries.
The participation of indigenous people in public diplomacy and
governmental efforts is also important because of the diverse
perspectives that they will bring to the resolution of the Bolivia-Chile
dispute—consistent with their ancestral views of reality. For example,
in describing the worldview of the Aymara people (who are
descendants of the Incas), the “Andean people, economic, spiritual, and
social life is inextricably tied to land and water. The Aymara of Chile
are struggling to maintain their sustainable and traditional systems of
irrigation water distribution, agriculture, and pastoralism in one of the
most arid regions of the world, the Atacama Desert.”212
Indigenous peoples who are the descendants of the Inca Empire
continue to inhabit the Atacama region of Chile. 213 Therefore, they are
an ethnic group that understands how the Bolivia-Chile territorial
conflict has undermined the international relations between the two
countries. The Aymara and Quechua people are a significant part of the
Bolivian population and they share similar indigenous worldviews as
the Aymara, Mapuche, and the other indigenous peoples of Chile that
can trace their roots to Tiwanaku and Tawantinsuyu. 214 For a negotiated
solution of the territorial conflict between Chile and Bolivia, there is a
need to reestablish a meaningful, honest and productive dialogue
between the parties to the conflict. The Aymara and other indigenous
worldviews recognize the moral imperative of resolving conflicts
through dialogue, communication, and by embracing a common human
identity. 215 To emphasize importance of indigenous territories in the
Aymara worldview, “Pachamama is the mother of Aymara culture
because existence itself is made possible through this inexhaustible

212. Amy Eisenberg, Jaqin Uraqpachat Amuyupa, The Aymara Cosmological
Vision, 5 LANGSCAPE MAG. (2016), https://medium.com/langscape-magazine/jaqinuraqpachat-amuyupa-f5df7806a8b8.
213. See
Héctor
M.
Morales,
Construcción
Social
De
La
Etnicidad: Ego y Alter En Atacama, 46 ESTUDIOS ATACAMEÑOS 145, 147 (2013).
214. See generally Kelly J. Knudson, La Influencia De Tiwanaku En San Pedro
De Atacama: Una Investigación Utilizando El Análisis De Isótopos Del Estroncio, 33
ESTUDIOS ATACAMEÑOS, 7–24 (2007).
215. Eisenberg, supra note 212.
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source of life. With Pachamama are all the generative spirits connected
with the animals and crops.”216
Reciprocity is one of the fundamental principles in reaching a
negotiated solution to the territorial dispute between Chile and Bolivia.
In the Aymara worldview, reciprocity is a fundamental normative
principle that sustains social networks as foundation for the social and
economic well-being of indigenous communities 217 Reciprocity in
international negotiations includes the idea of creating new value,
consistent with the interests of the parties, for their mutual benefit.
Considering the common cultural identity of the Aymara people and the
fact that they are one of the original inhabitants of the territory under
dispute, between Bolivia and Chile, they and other indigenous people,
including the Mapuche, are uniquely positioned to contribute to find a
negotiated solution to the problem. Regarding the importance of
considering the views of indigenous peoples:
[A]n early Incan family living in the coastal City of Arica and ponder
how the descendants of that family would manage when the land
changed hands multiple times between Bolivia, Peru, and Chile in
the 1800s. Such a family history would undoubtedly include stories
of indigenous populations being overrun by the Spanish, stories of
the later generations being pulled between loyalties to Spanish
royalty, and stories of independence movements motivated by both
the economic gain that would result from a change of regime and the
injustice of what the Spanish took from them initially. 218

The indigenous communities of Bolivia and Chile should express
their viewpoints regarding the peaceful resolution of the territorial
dispute between the two countries. Considering that indigenous peoples
were the original owners of the territories under dispute, and that their
descendants have been affected negatively—both economically and
existentially—by the Bolivia-Chile conflict, their worldviews and
interests should be considered in the resolution of the territorial dispute.

216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See ZWIER, supra note 45, at 223.
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CONCLUSION
In the Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia
v. Chile) case, the I.C.J. did not provide a legal discourse to enable Chile
and Bolivia to negotiate a peaceful solution to one of the most
significant territorial disputes in Latin America. The limitations of the
Court’s reasoning reflects its reliance on legal positivism as a main
method of legal analysis in the case. If the I.C.J. had utilized an
integrative jurisprudential approach in the interpretation of
international law, the Court could have considered the relevance of
historical, moral, and cultural aspects in the normative resolution of the
conflict. This could have demonstrated the importance of considering
the interests of the original owners of the territory under dispute, the
indigenous peoples of Bolivia and Chile. Considering the globally
recognized rights of indigenous peoples, including to their ancestral
territories, it was a mistake not to consider their views in the case.
Despite its verdict against Bolivia, the I.C.J. recognized that both
countries should continue to engage in diplomatic negotiations to find
a solution to a pending problem. This should encourage both countries
to reengage not only in diplomatic negotiations between governments,
but also in public diplomacy efforts. Such efforts can include dialogues
and negotiations between civil society organizations and with the
essential participation of indigenous communities. This is not only
consistent with the fundamental principles of global justice, but it is
also a pragmatic approach that facilitates the inclusion of diverse
normative and cultural worldviews in the processes in the resolution of
international conflicts. What the governments and ruling elites of
Bolivia and Chile were unable to achieve, can perhaps be accomplished
by indigenous peoples if they are given the opportunity to express their
views regarding a pending conflict that pertains to the original
territories.
This is especially relevant because Bolivia and Chile can trace their
historical roots to the Inca Empire, one of the greatest indigenous
civilizations in the history of humankind. This is also relevant because
in the 21st century context, the people of Chile and Bolivia have an
opportunity to demonstrate to the international community, that despite
their governments’ failures in resolving their domestic and international
problems, their public diplomatic efforts can create new opportunities
for the resolution of territorial disputes between neighboring countries.
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